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Abstract—A competitive deregulated electricity market with
increasingly active market players is foreseen to be the future of
the electricity industry. In such settings, market power assessment
is a primary concern. In this paper, we propose a novel functional
approach for measuring long term market power that unifies a
variety of popular market power indices. Specifically, the new
measure, termed transmission constrained network flow (TCNF),
unifies three large classes of market power measures: residual
supply based, network flow based, and minimal generation based.
Further, TCNF provides valuable information about market
power not captured by prior indices. We derive its analytic
properties and test its efficacy on IEEE test systems.
Index Terms—Market power, electricity markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Market monitoring is essential for maintaining efficient
electricity markets: not only is market power a significant chal-
lenge to the efficiency of today’s electricity markets, e.g., the
California energy crisis of 2000; monitoring market power will
become even more important in the coming years as we move
toward a future smart grid that includes significant penetration
of renewable energy, distributed generation, energy storage,
and increased penetration of demand-response programs. As
a result, new market power measures that quantify the impact
of these emerging developments are crucial.
However, electricity markets are particularly difficult envi-
ronments in which to identify market power. In fact, regulators
and economists have yet to develop standardized market power
measures for the electricity market, and the measures that are
in use today are typically ad hoc. As a result, there is a growing
(but typically fractured) literature seeking to improve market
power analysis for electricity markets.
In particular, there are two almost completely distinct lit-
eratures that focus on “long-term analysis” and “short-term
analysis”. Long term approaches most often study the potential
for market power, i.e., they are usually ex-ante. They are
useful for tasks such as market design evaluation, merger
analysis, operation planning, as well as for identifying “must-
run” generators in advance. Short term approaches most often
study the exploitation of market power, i.e., they are usually
ex-post. Typically, they are applied close to the spot market
and focus on things such as immediately mitigating market
conduct via penalties for withholding generation.
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In this paper, we focus on long term market power analysis;
however even within this domain the literature is quite frac-
tured. Broadly, these measures can be divided into three classes
that we term: “network flow based”, e.g., [1], [2], “residual
supply based”, e.g., [3], [4], and “minimal generation based”,
e.g., [5], [6]. We introduce each of these in Section II.
Given the fractured state of the market power literature,
it is important to begin to add “structure” by characterizing
the relationship between the existing measures. To that end,
the goal of this paper is to develop a unified approach
for measuring long term market power that bridges these
three types of market power analysis. Specifically, our main
contribution is to introduce a new functional market power
measure, termed “transmission constrained network flow”
(TCNF) which unifies network flow based, residual supply
based, and minimum generation based market power measures.
In fact, the single-value indices in these three measures can be
seen as special cases of the new functional measure. Further,
TCNF can provide valuable information about market power
not captured by prior indices. For example, the slope of the
TCNF function assesses the importance of each generator
at various demand or renewable generation levels. Finally,
calculating TCNF is computationally easy, which makes it an
attractive measure for market power analysis of large networks
in practice.
II. MARKET POWER MEASURES
Market power is most often defined as the ability to prof-
itably alter prices away from competitive levels [7]–[10]. Thus,
market power coincides with a form of market “dominance”,
where a player has the power to behave independently of
competitors and consumers in a manner that increases its
profitability. Such dominance can be gained globally, e.g., by
a power supplier with a large enough generation capacity in
a power pool, or locally, e.g., by a power supplier in a region
which has limited ability to import less expensive electricity
through transmission lines [11].
While the measures used in practice today are mostly
ad hoc, in recent years, principled design of market power
measures has begun to emerge, e.g., see [9] for an excellent
survey. When discussing such measures, a crucial distinction
is whether they focus on long term or short term analysis.
In this paper, we focus on long term market power analysis.
There is a large literature focusing on long term market power
analysis. Some examples of measures for long-term analysis
are [1], [3], [12]–[17]. Many of the earliest suggested measures
of market power ignore transmission constraints. For example,
Bushnell et al. introduced the pivotal supplier index (PSI)
as a binary indicator examining whether the capacity of a
2generator is larger than the supply surplus, i.e., the difference
between the total supply and the total demand [12]. Later,
Sheffrin et al. refined PSI by measuring market power on
a continuous scale, and proposed the residual supply index
(RSI) in [13], [14]. This index is used by the California ISO
to assure price competitiveness [15]. The electric reliability
council of Texas (ERCOT) uses a different measure, the
element competitiveness index (ECI) [16], which is based on
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (HHI) [17].
Each of these indices measure market power purely in
terms of dominance in generation capacity and fail to consider
the impact of transmission constraints, which are a crucial
component of market power in electricity markets because they
can create situations where a power supplier has significant
local market power if the region has limited ability to import
less expensive electricity through transmission lines.
More recently, a variety of measures that include transmis-
sion constraints have been introduced. We can classify these
into three categories that we term: “residual supply based”,
“network flow based”, and “minimal generation based”.
A. Residual supply based measures
Residual supply based measures are exemplified by [3], [4],
which propose the transmission-constrained residual supply
index (TCRSI). For each generator s, TCRSI measures the
maximum total load that the transmission-constrained electric-
ity market can support if generator of interest, s, is excluded:
TCRSIs = maximize
q,t
t
subject to 1†q = 1†(d¯t),
− b ≤ Hqq −Hd(d¯t) ≤ b,
qs = 0, 0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯i, i 6= s.
(1)
where q is the supply vector, t is the demand scaling parameter,
Hq is the generation shift factor matrix, Hd is load shift factor
matrix, b is the transmission line capacity vector, q¯i is the
capacity of generator i, d¯j is the demand of load j, 1 is a
unit vector, and † denotes transposition. If TCRSIs < 1, then
generator s may gain market power. Figure 1 gives an example
for TCRSI. For G1, TCRSI is 3.2/7, the fraction of demand
that can be met with available supply.
B. Network flow based measures
Network flow based measures are exemplified by [1], [2],
which model market power in the presence of transmission
constraints in terms of the maximal network flow (MNF)
achievable without the generator of interest. Thus, the mea-
sures in [1], [2] are similar to TCRSI in motivation; however,
they do not use power flow equations, which are crucial to
understanding power systems. To highlight this fact, note that
a key result in [1], [2] is that market power is supermodular,
i.e., there is always an incentive for generators to collude.
However, this conclusion no longer holds if the power flow
respects the impedances, e.g., in the network in Figure 1. Also,
see Section V for a counterexample in IEEE test systems.
C. Minimal generation based measures
In the above two definitions of market power, the fraction
of unmet demand is measured when a generator at bus s
is not in service. Alternatively, we can assess the market
power of this generator by calculating the minimum generation
required from it to meet the total demand. In particular,
minimal generation based measures typically focus on “must
run generators”, e.g., [5], [6]. They come in many forms,
but are exemplified by the transmission-constrained minimal
generator index (TCMGI):
TCMGIs = minimize
q
qs
subject to 1†q = 1†d¯,
− b ≤ Hqq −Hdd¯ ≤ b,
0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯i.
(2)
Unlike in (1), where qs = 0 is a constant and the total load
scaling factor t is a variable, in (2) the output of generator s
is a variable and the total load is a constant. If TCMGIs > 0,
then generator s may gain market power.
Note that TCMGIs does not, in general, equal the shortfall
in the network when generator at bus s is not operational.
To illustrate this, consider the network in Figure 1. It can be
checked that TCMGI1 = 4.2pu while the shortfall is actually
3.8pu when the same generator is not in service. The shortfall
and the minimum generation are, however, related. We explore
this in more detail in the next section.
III. A UNIFYING MARKET POWER FUNCTIONAL
The brief background on long term market power measures
in the previous section highlights the wide variety of measures
that exist, and that the literature is very fractured. The goal of
this paper is to provide a unified approach that facilitates the
study of future grid phenomena.
Toward that goal, we propose a new “functional” measure
for market power that unifies the residual supply based mea-
sures, network flow based measures, and minimal generation
based measures. We term our measure the transmission-
constrained network flow (TCNF), and define it as follows:
TCNFs(ρ) = maximize
q,d
D
subject to 1†q = 1†d = D,
− b ≤ Hgq −Hdd ≤ b,
0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯i,
qs ≤ ρ,
0 ≤ dj ≤ d¯j .
(3)
It is immediately clear that TCNFs(ρ) generalizes network
flow based and residual supply based measures. In particular,
TCNFs(0) is the maximal network flow satisfying the DC
power flow constraints when generator s is removed. Further,
TCNFs(0) is nearly the same as TCRSIs, with the caveat that
the load is not restricted to be scaled uniformly at different
buses. The relationship to minimal generation measures is not
as clear. However, note that TCNFs(TCMGIs) = 1†d¯. Further,
we can prove that TCNFs(ρ) is the inverse of a generalization
of TCMGIs. To see this, next we define the transmission-
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Fig. 1. A small network to illustrate market power indices. All quantities are
measured in per units (p.u.). z denotes impedance and b denotes line capacity.
constrained minimal generation (TCMG) function as:
TCMGs(D) = minimize
q,d
qs,
subject to 1†q = 1†d = D,
− b ≤ Hgq −Hdd ≤ b,
0 ≤ qi ≤ q¯i,
0 ≤ dj ≤ d¯j .
(4)
Note that, TCMGs(1†d¯) is the same as TCMGIs. Further,
the function TCMGs(D) generalizes TCMGIs in the sense
that it measures the minimum generation that is needed from
generator s to support load 0 ≤ D < 1†d¯, i.e., a portion of
the total load. Using this measure, we can state the following
theorem. The proof is omitted due to space constraints.
Theorem 1. For each generator s, the TCNFs(ρ) and
TCMGs(D) functions are inverse functions of each other, i.e.,
for 0 ≤ D ≤ 1†d¯, TCNFs[TCMGs(D)] = D. Furthermore,
TCNFs(ρ) is a continuous, piecewise linear, concave, and
monotonic increasing and TCMGs(D) is a continuous, piece-
wise linear, convex, and monotonic increasing functions.
Thus, TCNFs(ρ) unifies the three classes of long term
market power measures. A key distinction of TCNFs(ρ) from
earlier measures is its functional form. By providing a param-
eterized definition of market power, it allows us to study the
impact of the generator on the satisfiable demand (D). In other
words, it captures the necessary capacity from generator s in
order to satisfy different levels of demand, which is crucial
when seeking to understand market power in the presence
of dispatchable loads, demand response, and distributed and
renewable generation. The case studies in Section IV highlight
the usefulness of the functional form for these settings.
A. A simple example
Before discussing additional properties of TCNF, we present
a simple example of its use on the network shown in Figure
1. Recall that we have earlier calculated TCRSI and TCMGI
for the network in Figure 1.
In Figure 2 we plot the TCNF function for each of the
two generators in the network shown in Figure 1. As stated in
Theorem 1, the TCNF function is piecewise linear, increasing,
and concave for both generators. Additionally, the y-intercept
matches the TCRSI for each generator and the quantity at
which the maximal demand is satisfied matches the TCMGI
for each generator. Further, we can interpret the graph as
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Fig. 2. TCNF for each generator in the network shown in Figure 1.
follows. Consider a level of total demand of 6.5pu that is
less than the target level of 7pu. At this demand level, slope
of TCNF1 is lower than that of TCNF2, i.e., G2 has to supply
more than G1 to satisfy an extra unit of demand and hence G2
is more valuable to the system operator at this demand level.
For a system with dispatchable loads, the plots of TCNFs as
in Figure 2 gives valuable insight into the importance of each
generator at various demand levels.
Alternatively, consider the case where one generator is not
operational, i.e., consider TCNF1(0) and TCNF2(0) in Figure
2. The shortfall in demand is higher when G2 is not operational
and hence is more valuable to the system operator from a
security standpoint. We can generalize this interpretation to
any generation level ρ. In other words, generator at bus s with
the minimum TCNFs(ρ) is more valuable and hence enjoys
more market power. In Figure 2, notice that the generator with
most market power changes with the generation level ρ.
The discussion above highlights the valuable extra informa-
tion provided as a result of the functional form of TCNF.
B. Computation of TCNF
It is important to discuss briefly the computational demands
of calculating the TCNF. In particular, computing the solution
to the optimal power flow problem with the lossless DC-OPF
approximation is computationally expensive for large power
networks [18], [19]. Since TCNF is a variation of the OPF
problem, computing it for generator at bus s for all 0 ≤ ρ ≤ q¯s
may also be expected to be computationally expensive.
However, TCNF has a number of properties that can be
exploited to simplify its computational demands. Importantly,
the function TCNFs(ρ) is piecewise linear. Thus, using La-
grangian duality [20], [21], we can characterize the slopes
of the piecewise linear segments of TCNFs(ρ) and use these
slopes to provide an efficient way to compute TCNFs.
More specifically, for generator s, let the Lagrange multi-
plier for constraint qs ≤ ρ in (3) be µ. For any function f(z)
in variable z, define (df(z)/dz)+ as its right-hand derivative
[22]. Also, for any variable z in the problem, let z∗ denote
its value at the optimum. We can now relate the slopes of the
linear segments of the functions TCNFs(ρ) as follows:(
d TCNFs(ρ)
d ρ
)+
= µ∗. (5)
The proof leading to (5) is omitted due to space constraints.
Note that, since TCNFs(ρ) is piecewise linear it is non-
4differentiable at the end-points of each line segment. But, (5)
only involves the right-hand derivative and is well-defined.
Next, using (5), we present the following recursive algo-
rithm for computing TCNFs(ρ) for ρ in any interval [a, b].
Algorithm 1.
1) Compute TCNFs(a) and TCNFs(b) using a standard
primal-dual linear program solver [21], [23]. Also, ob-
tain the Lagrange multiplier µ∗ (call them µ∗(a) and
µ∗(b) respectively). Let (ρa,b, Da,b) solve:
Da,b − TCNFs(a) = µ∗(a)[ρa,b − a],
Da,b − TCNFs(b) = µ∗(b)[ρa,b − b],
where a ≤ ρa,b ≤ b.
2) If TCNFs(ρa,b) = Da,b, then in interval [a, b]:
TCNFs(ρ) =
{
TCNFs(a) + µ∗(a)[ρ− a], a ≤ ρ ≤ ρa,b,
TCNFs(b) + µ∗(b)[ρ− b], ρa,b ≤ ρ ≤ b.
If TCNFs(ρa,b) 6= Da,b, then repeat steps 1 and 2 over
the intervals [a, ρa,b] and [ρa,b, b].
Using Algorithm 1 we can compute TCNFs(ρ) for ρ in
[0, q¯s]. Further, it can be checked that the algorithm finishes
in at most 2ω + 1 iterations, where ω is the number of line
segments in TCNFs(ρ) over ρ in [0, q¯s]. Also, ω ≤ 2E , where
E denotes the number of transmission lines in the grid. In
practice, however, the number of segments is usually quite
small and so this method computes TCNFs(ρ) efficiently. This
can be observed empirically for the case studies in Section IV.
IV. CASE STUDIES
In order to illustrate the use of TCNF in realistic scenarios,
we explore the market power of generators in the IEEE test
systems in [24]. This exploration highlights the importance of
market power, and the subtleties of the interaction of market
power with varying demand (e.g., as a result of distributed
renewable generation) and dispatchable load.
We have explored TCNF in the context of all the IEEE test
systems, but here we only discuss two cases: the IEEE 9-bus
system and the IEEE 39-bus system. In each case, we look at
a variety of scalings of the target demands in the test system to
understand the impact of demand fluctuations and distributed
renewable generation. Specifically, the target demands are all
scaled uniformly by a scalar t ≥ 0. Further, in most IEEE
systems, generators have a minimum level of generation, i.e.,
q ≥ q. We modify q = 0 for convenience.
The results for the 9-bus system (with t = 1.8 and 2.0) and
39-bus system (with t = 1.0 and 1.1) are shown in Figure
3(a) and 3(b) respectively. For the 39 bus system, TCNFs(ρ)
for only the generators at buses 31, 35, 38 and 39 is plotted
in order to simplify the presentation. Before discussing each
case in detail, note that for all plots, the y-intercept of each
TCNFs plot is the TCRSIs and the minimum ρ for which all
demands are met is TCMGIs.
A. IEEE 9-bus system
The most important point to observe in the 9-bus system
is that for t = 1.8, the order of generators according to
market power (or TCNFs) changes with ρ. This indicates that
incremental value of each firm to meet additional demand
will typically depend on the actual demand, and thus the
the quantity of dispatchable load interacts strongly with the
market power of generators. This effect was not observable
using previous market power measures. Further, Figure 3(a)
highlights that generator 2 has the highest market power when
t = 1.8, while generator 3 has the most market power when
t = 2.0. Since the demand levels vary over a typical day,
generators can be expected to have their market power vary
during the day as a result of, e.g., the amount of distributed
renewable generation available. This can play a significant role
in the strategic behavior of generators. The plot in Figure 4(a)
illustrates this effect further. It shows the lower envelope of the
TCNF curves for the generators listed in the legend, and uses
color to indicate which generator defines this lower envelope,
i.e., which generator has the most market power. The figure
highlights that there is a subtle interaction between fluctuating
demand, dispatchable load, and market power.
B. IEEE 39-bus system
The observations about the 39-bus system parallel those
above for the 9-bus system. In particular, we can see that
generator 39 maintains the highest market power for the
scaling of t = 1.0 and t = 1.1. However, the ordering
of market power changes, e.g., when t = 1.0, generator at
bus 38 is not pivotal but gains significant market power for
t = 1.1 especially at higher ρ. To illustrate the role of demand
variation, we only consider generators at buses 31, 35 and 38
and plot the lower envelope of the TCNFs for these generators
for demand levels ranging from t = 1.0 to t = 1.15 in
Figure 4(b). It is interesting that the generator with highest
market power varies a significantly depending on the amount
of dispatchable load considered and the variation in demand.
We emphasize that the nuances of such a complex interactions
can not be observed using any of the prior market power
measures considered in the literature.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have introduced a new long term market
power measure that unifies three large, distinct classes of
measures considered previously in the literature. This new
transmission constrained network flow (TCNF) functional
measure, not only unifies prior measures, it also provides
new detailed insight into the market power of generators. To
highlight this, we have performed case studies using the IEEE
test systems.
This paper is a first step toward understanding and de-
veloping the TCNF measure. There are a number of future
directions that are important to study. For example, it would
be interesting to incorporate an AC power flow model in
place of the DC model considered in this paper. Further, an
important generalization is to generation “firms” with multiple
generators. We have briefly looked at this issue already, and
have found it to be subtle and important. In particular, previous
work has suggested that market power is supermodular, and
thus there is always incentives for generators to collude and
form large firms [1], [2]. However, [1], [2] did not use power
flow constraints in their study, and we have found using TCNF
that, while often true, there are certainly counter examples
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Fig. 3. TCNFs for various generators in the IEEE 9-bus and 39-bus benchmark systems.
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Fig. 4. The lower envelope of TCNFs for the listed generators in the IEEE 9-bus and 39-bus benchmark systems with different scalings of demand.
to such a claim. For example, in the IEEE 9-bus system
with t = 1.7, supermodularity does not hold, e.g., for the
combination of generators at buses (1, 3) and (2, 3).
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